Political Concept of Human Nature

Throughout this book, and indeed throughout political theory, there is a recurrent theme: the relationship between the individual and society. This touches on almost all political debates and controversies – the nature of justice, the proper realm of freedom, the desirability of equality, the value of politics, and so forth. At the heart of this issue lies the idea of human nature, that which makes human beings ‘human’. Almost all political doctrines and beliefs are based upon some kind of theory of human nature, sometimes explicitly formu-lated but in many cases simply implied. To do otherwise would be to take the complex and perhaps unpredictable human element out of politics.

However, the concept of human nature has also been a source of great difficulty for political theorists. Models of human nature have varied consider-ably, and each model has radically different implications for how social and poli-tical life should be organized. Are human beings, for instance, selfish or sociable, rational or irrational, essentially moral or basically corrupt? Are they, at heart, political animals or private beings? The answers to such questions bear heavily upon the relationship between the individual and society. In particular, how much of human behaviour is shaped by natural or innate forces, and how much is conditioned by the social environment? Are human beings ‘individuals’, inde-pendent from one another and possessed of separate and unique characters, or are they social beings, whose identity and behaviour are shaped by the groups to which they belong? Such questions have not only been enduring topics of philo-sophical debate – the choice between ‘nurture’ and ‘nature’ – but have also been the cornerstone of one of the deepest of ideological divisions: the conflict between individualism and collectivism.

Human Nature

All too often the idea of human nature is employed in a generalized and simplistic fashion, as a kind of shorthand for ‘this is what people are really like’. In practice, however, to speak of ‘human nature’ is to make a number of important assumptions about both human beings and the societies in which they live. Although opinions may differ about the content of human nature, the concept itself has a clear and coherent meaning. Human nature refers to the essential and immutable character of all human beings. It highlights what is innate and ‘natural’ about human life, as opposed to what human beings have gained from education or through social experience. This does not, however, mean that those who believe that human behaviour is shaped more by society than it is by unchanging and inborn characteristics have abandoned the idea of human nature altogether. Indeed, this very assertion is based upon clear assumptions about innate human qualities, in this case, the capacity to be shaped or moulded by external factors. A limited number of political thinkers have, nevertheless, openly rejected the idea of human nature. For instance, the French existentialist philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80), argued that there was no such thing as a given ‘human nature’, determining how people act or behave. In Sartre’s view, existence comes before essence, meaning that human beings enjoy the freedom to define themselves through their own actions and deeds, in which case the assertion of any concept of human nature is an affront to that freedom.

To employ a concept of human nature is not, however, to reduce human life to a one-dimensional caricature. Most political thinkers are clearly aware that human beings are complex, multi-faceted creatures, made up of biological, physical, psychological, intellectual, social and perhaps spiritual elements. The concept of human nature does not conceal or overlook this complexity so much as attempt to impose order upon it by designating certain features as ‘natural’ or ‘essential’. It would seem reasonable, moreover, that if any such thing as a human core exists it should be manifest in human behaviour. Human nature should therefore be reflected in behavioural patterns that are regular and distinctively human. However, this may not always be the case. Some theorists have argued that people behave in ways that deny their ‘true’ natures. For instance, despite abundant evidence of greedy and selfish behaviour, socialists still hold to the belief that human beings are cooperative and sociable, arguing that such behaviour is socially conditioned and not natural. In this light, it is important to remember that in no sense is human nature a descriptive or scientific concept. Even though theories of human nature may claim an empirical or scientific basis, no experiment or surgical investigation is able to uncover the human ‘essence’. All models of human nature are therefore normative: they are constructed out of philosophical and moral assump-tions, and are therefore in principle untestable.

Endless discussion has taken place about the nature of human beings. Certain debates have been nevertheless particularly relevant to political theory. Central among these is what is usually called the ‘nature/nurture’ debate. Are human beings the product of innate or biological factors, or are they fashioned by education and social experience? Clearly, such a question has profound implications for the relationship between the individual and society. Important questions have also been asked about the degree to which human behaviour is determined by reason, questions which bear heavily upon issues such as individual liberty and personal autonomy. Are human beings rational creatures, guided by reason, argument and calculation, or are they in some way prisoners of non-rational drives and passions? Finally, there are questions about the impulses or motivations which dominate human behaviour. In particular, are human beings naturally selfish and egoistical, or are they essentially cooperative, altruistic and sociable? Such considerations are crucial in determining the proper organization of economic and social life, including the distribution of wealth and other resources.

Nature versus Nurture

The most recurrent, and perhaps most fundamental debate about human nature relates to what factors or forces shape it. Is the essential core of human nature fixed or given, fashioned by ‘nature’, or is it moulded or structured by the influence of social experience or ‘nurture’. ‘Nature’, in this case, stands for biological or genetic factors, suggesting that there is an established and unchanging human core. The political significance of such a belief is considerable. In the first place, it implies that political and social theories should be constructed on the basis of a pre-established concept of human nature. Quite simply, human beings do not reflect society, society reflects human nature. Secondly, it suggests that the roots of political understanding lie in the natural sciences in general, and in biology in particular. Political arguments shall therefore be constructed on the basis of biological theories, giving such arguments a ‘scientific’ character. This helps to explain why biological theories of politics have grown in popularity in the twentieth century.

Without doubt, the biological theory that has had greatest impact upon political and social thought has been the theory of natural selection, developed by Charles Darwin (1809–82) in On the Origin of Species ([1859] 1986). Darwin’s goal was to explain the almost infinite variety of species which have existed on earth. He suggested that each species develops through a series of random genetic mutations, some of which fit the species to survive and prosper, while other less fortunate species become extinct. Although Darwin appears to have recognized that his theories had radical political implications, he chose not to develop them himself. The first attempt to advance a theory of social Darwinism was undertaken by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) in The Man Versus the State ([1884] 1940). Spencer coined the term ‘the survival of the fittest’ to describe what he believed to be an endless struggle among human beings, through which those best fitted by nature to survive rise to the top, and those less favoured by nature sink to the bottom. Success and failure, wealth and poverty are, in this sense, biologically determined; and tampering with this process of natural selection will only serve to weaken the species. Such ideas deeply influenced classical liberalism, giving it biological grounds for opposing state intervention in economic and social life. Social Darwinism also helped to shape the fascist belief in an unending struggle amongst the various nations or races of the world.

In the twentieth century, political theories were increasingly influenced by biological ideas. For example, ethologists such as Konrad Lorenz and Niko Timbergen advanced theories about human behaviour on the basis of detailed studies of animal behaviour. In On Aggression (1966), Lorenz suggested that aggression was a natural drive found in all species, including the human species. Popularized by writers like Robert Ardrey, such ideas had considerable impact upon explanations of war and social violence by presenting such behaviour as instinctual and territorial. The emergence of sociobiology in the 1970s and the subsequent development of evolutionary psychology, which gained impetus from the so-called ‘biotech revolution’ and the unravelling of human DNA, has made it increasingly fashionable to explain social behaviour in terms of biological programming linked to our supposed evolutionary inheritance. One of the most influential works of sociobiology has been Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene (1989), which explains man as a ‘gene machine’. Dawkins suggested that both selfishness and altruism have their origins in biology.

In most cases, these biological theories embrace universalism; they hold that human beings share a common or universal character, based upon their genetic inheritance. Other theories, however, hold that there are fundamental biological differences among human beings, and that these are of political significance. This applies in the case of racialist theories which treat the various races as if they are distinct species. Racialists suggest that there are basic genetic differences amongst the races of the world, reflected in their unequal physical, psychological and intellectual inheritance. In its most extreme version, racialism was expressed in the Nazi doctrine of Aryanism, the belief that the Germanic peoples are a ‘master race’. One school of radical feminism, sometimes called separatist feminism, also believes that there are biological and unchangeable differences among human beings, in this case between men and women. This theory is called ‘essentialism’ because it asserts that the difference between women and men is rooted in their ‘essential’ natures. Sexual inequality is not therefore based upon social conditioning but rather on the biological disposition of the male sex to dominate, exploit and oppress the female sex. For example, in Against Our Will (1975), Susan Brownmiller suggested that ‘all men’ are biologically programmed to dominate ‘all women’, and that they do so through rape or the fear of rape, a conclusion which, from a different perspective, certain theories of evolutionary psychology also support.

In marked contrast, other theories of human nature place greater emphasis upon ‘nurture’, the influence of the social environment or experience upon the human character. Clearly, such views play down the importance of fixed and unchanging biological factors, emphasising instead the malleable quality of human nature, or what has been called its ‘plasticity’. The significance of such theories is to shift political under-standing away from biology and towards sociology. Political behaviour tells us less about an immutable human essence than it does about the structure of society. Moreover, by releasing humankind from its biological chains, such theories often have optimistic, if not openly utopian, implications. When human nature is ‘given’, the possibility of progress and social advancement is clearly limited; however, if human nature is ‘plastic’, the opportunities confronting human beings immediately expand and perhaps become infinite. Evils such as poverty, social conflict, political oppression and gender inequality can be overcome precisely because their origins are social and not biological.

The idea that human nature is ‘plastic’, shaped by external forces, is central to many socialist theories. For instance, in A New View of Society ([1816] 1972), the British socialist Robert Owen advanced the simple principle that ‘any general character from the best to the worst, from the ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any commu-nity’. In the writings of Karl Marx this idea was developed through an attempt to outline why and how the social environment conditions human behaviour. Marx proclaimed that, ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.’ Marx, and subsequent Marxists, have believed that social, political and intellectual life is conditioned by ‘the mode of production of material life’, the existing economic system. However, Marx did not believe human nature to be a passive reflection of its material environment. Rather, human beings are workers, homo faber, constantly engaged in shaping and reshaping the world in which they live. Thus, in Marx’s view, human nature is formed through a dynamic or ‘dialectical’ relationship between humankind and the material world. The majority of feminists also subscribe to the view that human behaviour is in most cases conditioned by social factors. For example, in her seminal work, The Second Sex ([1949] 1968), Simone de Beauvoir (see p. 63) declared that, ‘One is not born a woman: one becomes a woman.’ In rejecting the notion of ‘essential’ differences between women and men, feminists have accepted a basically androgynous, or sexless, image of human nature. Because sexism has been ‘bred’ through a process of social conditioning, particularly in the family, it can be challenged and eventually overthrown.

The picture of human nature as essentially malleable, shaped by social factors, has also been endorsed by behavioural psychologists, such as I.V. Pavlov, John Watson and B.F. Skinner. They argue that human behaviour is explicable simply in terms of conditioned reactions or reflexes, for which reason human nature bears the imprint of its environment. Pavlov, for instance, demonstrated how animals could learn through a strict process of conditioning, by being rewarded for exhibiting ‘correct’ behaviour. Such ideas became the basis of psychology in the Soviet Union, where crude behaviourism was thought to provide scientific proof for Marx’s social theories. The US psychologist B.F. Skinner discounted internal processes altogether, describing the human organism as a ‘black box’. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), Skinner presented a highly deterministic picture of human nature, denied any form of free will, and entitled, Skinner suggested, to no more dignity or self-respect than Pavlov’s dog. Such ideas have widely been used to support the idea of social engineering, the idea that we can ‘make’ the human beings we want simply by constructing the appropriate social environment.

Intellect versus Instinct

The second debate centres upon the role of rationality in human life. This does not, however, come down to a choice between rationalism and irrationalism. The real issue is the degree to which the reasoning mind influences human conduct, suggesting a distinction between those who emphasize thinking, analysis and rational calculation, and those who highlight the role of impulse, instincts or other non-rational drives. To acknowledge the importance of the non-rational does not amount to turning one’s back upon reason altogether. Indeed, many such theories are advanced in eminently rationalist, even scientific, terms.

Faith in the power of human reason reached its high point during the Enlightenment, the so-called Age of Reason, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During that period, philosophers and political thinkers turned away from religious dogmas and faith, and instead based their ideas upon rationalism, the belief that the workings of the physical and social world can be explained by the exercise of reason alone. In this view, human beings are essentially rational creatures, guided by intellect and a process of argument, analysis and debate. Such an idea was expressed with particular clarity in the dualism advanced by the French philosopher, Rene´Descartes (1596–1650). In declaring ‘Cogito ergo sum [I think, therefore I am]’, Descartes in effect portrayed human beings as thinking machines, implying that the mind is quite distinct from the body. Rationalism implies that human beings possess the capacity to fashion their own lives and their own worlds. If human beings are reason-driven creatures they clearly enjoy free will and self-determination: people are what they choose to make of themselves. Rationalist theories of human nature therefore tend to underline the importance of individual freedom and autonomy. In addition, rationalism often underpins radical or revolu-tionary political doctrines. To the extent that human beings possess the capacity to understand their world, they have the ability also to improve or reform it.

The earliest rationalist ideas were developed by the philosophers of Ancient Greece. Plato, for example, argued that the best possible form of government would be an enlightened despotism, rule by an intellectual elite, the philosopher-kings. Rationalist ideas were also prominent in the emergence in the nineteenth century of liberal and socialist doctrines. Liberal thinkers, such as J.S. Mill, largely based their theories upon the idea that human beings are rational. This, for instance, explains why Mill himself placed so much faith in individual liberty: guided by reason, individuals would be able to seek happiness and self-realization. In the same way, he argued in favour of female suffrage, on the grounds that, like men, women are rational and so are entitled to exercise political influence. In turn, socialist theories also built upon rationalist foundations. This was most evident in the writings of Marx and Engels, who developed what the latter referred to as ‘scientific socialism’. Rather than indulging in ethical analysis and moral assertion, the province of so-called ‘utopian socialism’, Marx and Engels strove to uncover the dynamics of history and society through a process of scientific analysis. When they predicted the ultimate demise of capitalism, for example, this was not because they believed it to be morally ‘bad’, in the sense that it deserved to be overthrown, but instead because their analysis indicated that this was what was destined to happen, this was the direction in which history was moving.

This vision of human beings as thinking machines has, however, attracted growing criticism since the late nineteenth century. The Enlight-enment dream of an ordered, rational and tolerant world was badly dented by the persistence of conflict and social deprivation and the emergence of powerful and seemingly non-rational forces such as nationalism and racialism. This led to growing interest in the influence which emotion, instinct and other psychological drives exert upon politics. In some respects, however, this development built upon an established tradition, found mainly among conservative thinkers, that had always disparaged the mania for rationalism. Edmund Burke, for example, had emphasized the intellectual imperfection of human beings, especially when they are confronted by the almost infinite complexity of social life. In short, the world is unfathomable, too intricate and too confusing for the human mind fully to unravel. Such a view has deeply conservative implications. If the rationalist theories dreamed up by liberals and socialists are unconvincing, human beings are wise to place their faith in tradition and custom, the known. Revolution and even reform are a journey into the unknown; the maps we have been given are simply unreliable.

At the same time, conservative theorists were among the first to acknowledge the power of the non-rational. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, believed in the power of human reason, but only as a means to an end. In his view, human beings are driven by non-rational appetites: aversions, fears, hopes and desires, the strongest of which is the desire to exercise power over others. This essentially pessimistic view of human nature led Hobbes to conclude that only strong, autocratic government can prevent society descending into chaos and disorder. Burke also emphasized the degree to which unreasoned sentiments and even prejudice play a role in structuring social life. While what he called ‘naked reason’ offers little guidance, prejudice, being born of natural instincts, provides people with security and a sense of social identity. Some modern biologists have offered a scientific explanation for such beliefs. Konrad Lorenz, in particular, argued that aggression is a form of biologically adapted behaviour which has developed through the process of evolution. Human aggression and cruelty is therefore seen as innate or ‘natural’, an assertion that clearly has pessimistic implications for any attempt to curb domestic violence, cure social unrest or prevent war.

Some of the most influential theories to stress the impact of non-rational drives upon human behaviour were associated with Freudian psychology, developed in the early twentieth century. Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) drew attention to the distinction between the conscious mind, which carried out rational calculations and judgements, and the unconscious mind, which contained repressed memories and a range of powerful psychological drives. In particular, Freud highlighted the importance of human sexuality, represented by the id, the most primitive instinct within the unconscious, and libido, psychic energies emanating from the id and usually associated with sexual desire or energy. While Freud himself emphasized the therapeutic aspect of these ideas, developing a series of techniques, popularly known as psychoanalysis, others have seized upon their political significance. Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957), one of Freud’s later disciples, developed an explanation of fascism based on the idea of repressed sexuality. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10, New Left thinkers like Herbert Marcuse and feminists such as Germaine Greer (1985) have drawn upon Freudian psychology in developing a politics of sexual liberation.

Competition versus Cooperation

The third area of disagreement centres upon whether human beings are essentially self-seeking and egoistical, or naturally sociable and coopera-tive. This debate is of fundamental political importance because these contrasting theories of human nature support radically different forms of economic and social organization. If human beings are naturally self-interested, competition among them is an inevitable feature of social life and, in certain respects, a healthy one. Such a theory of human nature is, moreover, closely linked to individualist ideas such as natural rights and private property, and has often been used as a justification for a market or capitalist economic order, within which, supposedly, individuals have the best opportunity to pursue their own interests.

Theories which portray human nature as self-interested or self-seeking can be found among the Ancient Greeks, expressed particularly by some of the Sophists. However, they were developed most systematically in the early modern period. In political thought this was reflected in the growth of natural rights theories, which suggested that each individual has been invested by God with a set of inalienable rights. These rights belong to the individual and to the individual alone. Utilitarianism, devel-oped in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, attempted to provide an objective, even scientific, explanation of human selfishness. Jeremy Bentham painted a picture of human beings as essentially hedonistic and pleasure-seeking creatures. In Bentham’s view, pleasure or happiness are self-evidently ‘good’, and pain or unhappiness self-evidently ‘bad’. Individuals therefore act to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, calculating each in terms of ‘utility’ – in its simplest sense, use-value. This view of human nature has had considerable impact upon both economic and political theories. Economics is based very largely upon the model of ‘economic man’, materially self-interested ‘utility maximi-zers’. Such philosophical assumptions are used, for example, to explain the vigour and efficiency of market capitalism. They also underpin political theories ranging from the social-contract theories of the seventeenth century to ‘rational choice' and ‘public choice’ schools of modern political science.

Scientific support for human self-interestedness has usually been based upon Darwin and the idea of some kind of struggle for survival. Darwinian ideas, however, can be interpreted in very different ways. Writers such as Lorenz and Ardrey hold that each individual member of a species is biologically programmed to ensure the survival of the species itself. Such a view suggests that animals, including human beings, ultimately act ‘for the good of the species’, an idea reflected in the willingness of a mother to sacrifice herself in the hope of protecting her young. In other words, individuals will exhibit cooperative and sociable behaviour to the extent that they put the species before themselves. On the other hand, modern writers such as Richard Dawkins (1989) have argued that every gene, including those unique to the separate individual, has a selfish streak and seeks its own survival. Such a theory suggests that selfishness and competition amongst individuals is essentially a form of biologically programmed behaviour. This is not to say, however, that human beings are blindly selfish. Although Dawkins accepted that individuals are ‘born selfish’, he emphasised that such behaviour can be modified if we ‘teach generosity and altruism’.

A very different image of human nature is, however, presented by the major world religions. Monotheistic religions such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism offer a picture of humankind as the product of divine creation. The human essence is therefore conceived as spiritual rather than mental or physical, and is represented in Christianity by the idea of a ‘soul’. The notion that human beings are moral creatures, bound together by divine providence, has had considerable influence upon socialist doctrines which stress the importance of compassion, natural sympathy and a common humanity. Eastern religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism lay considerable emphasis upon the oneness of all forms of life, contributing once again to the idea of a common humanity, as well as a philosophy of non-violence. It is little surprise, therefore, that religious doctrines have often underpinned the theories of ethical socialism. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all religious theories have socialist implications. For instance, the Protestant belief in individual salvation and its stress upon the moral value of personal striving and hard work, often called the ‘Protestant ethic’, is more clearly linked to the ideas of self-help and the free market than it is to socialist compassion. In addition, the Christian doctrine of original sin has generated a pessimistic view of humanity which, in turn, has considerable impact upon social and political thought. This can be seen in the writings of St Augustine and Martin Luther.

Secular theories have also attempted to draw attention to the ‘social essence’ of human nature. These have traditionally stressed the importance of social being, drawing attention to the fact that individuals both live and work collectively, as members of a community. Selfishness and competi-tion are in no way ‘natural’; rather, they have been cultivated by a capitalist society that rewards and encourages self-striving. The human essence is sociable, gregarious and cooperative, a theory which clearly lends itself to either the communist goal of collective ownership, or the more modest socialist ideal of a welfare state. One of the few attempts to develop a scientific theory of human nature along the lines of sociability and cooperativeness was undertaken by Peter Kropotkin. Kropotkin accepted the evolutionary ideas that had dominated biology since Darwin, but had no sympathy for the doctrine of ‘the survival of the fittest’. In Mutual Aid ([1897] 1902), he developed an evolutionary theory that fundamentally challenged Darwinism. Instead of accepting that survival is the result of struggle or competition, Kropotkin suggested that what distinguishes the human species from less successful species is its highly developed capacity for cooperation or ‘mutual aid’. Cooperation is therefore not merely an ethical or religious ideal, it is a practical necessity which the evolutionary process has made an essential part of human nature. On this basis, Kropotkin argued in favour of both a communist society, in which wealth would be owned in common by all, and a form of anarchism in which human beings could manage their own affairs cooperatively and peacefully.